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i Abstract 
A nutrient trading system is one mechanism that is currently being 
considered to control and reduce nutrient loss into Lake Rotorua. However this 
may not be the best mechanism for controlling nutrient loss from all sources. A 
more comprehensive system improves efficiency and decreases market power 
opportunities, but it can also bring increased compliance and administrative costs. 
This paper discusses which sources should be included in a nutrient trading 
system for Lake Rotorua. It examines existing systems and presents an empirical 
analysis to estimate the impact of including different nutrient sources. 
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iv 1 Introduction 
A variety of policies can be used to control nutrient loss into 
waterways, including direct controls on land use activities, compulsory 
implementation of mitigation options and nutrient trading systems. Each policy 
will be more effective in controlling nutrient loss from some sources than others. 
Thus, when implementing a policy, it is important to identify the types of nutrient 
sources that the policy will be able to effectively control.  
A nutrient trading system is one mechanism that is currently being 
considered to control and reduce nutrient loss into Lake Rotorua. This is likely to 
be a cost effective method of controlling and reducing nutrient loss from a number 
of nutrient sources including pastoral farming. However, it may not be an 
effective mechanism for all sources in the catchment.  
For water quality in Lake Rotorua to improve, the total amount of 
nutrients entering the lake from all sources needs to be controlled. The system 
design needs to consider sources both within and outside the trading system to 
ensure that the total nutrient cap is not exceeded (see Kerr et al (2007)). The 
sources within the nutrient trading system will have their nutrient loss limited by 
the trading cap, but sources outside the trading system may or may not have their 
nutrient loss controlled. If these sources are ignored by regulation then this is a 
lost opportunity to reduce nutrient loss. If they are regulated under separate 
regulations then we are not ensuring that the marginal cost of the reductions 
equals the market price or that we achieve the efficiency benefits possible from a 
comprehensive nutrient trading system. Thus these reductions undertaken outside 
the nutrient trading system might be much more expensive than reductions 
undertaken by sources within the system. 
This paper discusses which sources should be included in a nutrient 
trading system for Lake Rotorua. We present benefits and costs associated with a 
more comprehensive trading system. We then examine existing systems to 
identify the sources that have (and have not) been included in each system. This 
includes two New Zealand trading systems (Lake Taupo nutrient trading system 
and the Quota Management System (QMS) for managing commercial fisheries) 
1 and a brief look at international nutrient trading systems. Finally, we discuss the 
options for the Lake Rotorua catchment. We use data provided by Environment 
Bay of Plenty (EBOP) to analyse land-based sources of nutrients and provide 
insight into the impact of including particular types of land-based sources in the 
system. 
This paper is part of a series of papers on various aspects of design of a 
nutrient trading system for Lake Rotorua. These papers can be found at 
www.motu.org.nz/nutrient_trading. 
1.1  Benefits of a comprehensive system 
A comprehensive nutrient trading system is likely to have a number of 
benefits as a result of greater opportunities for trade. These benefits could include 
improved efficiency, improved market liquidity and decreased market power 
opportunities.  
1.1.1  Provides greater opportunity for efficiency benefits. 
  Nutrient trading systems allow the required nutrient loss reductions to 
take place in the most cost effective time periods and locations, but only from the 
sources that are included in the system. The greatest flexibility and efficiency will 
be achieved in a system that includes all sources.  
  For example, suppose that the cost of reducing nutrient loss through 
storm water system upgrades was high but that golf courses could reduce their 
nutrient loss at a low cost. If we included both of these sources in the system, 
instead of undertaking the expensive nutrient loss reduction option of upgrading 
the storm water system, the council could instead pay the golf courses to reduce 
their nutrient loss, through purchasing allowances from the golf course. This 
would enable the same level of nutrient reductions to be achieved at a much lower 
cost. But if storm water and/or golf courses were excluded from the system, the 
nutrient reductions cannot move between sources. Thus, the council would face 
higher costs to achieve the same level of nutrient loss reductions.  
To date, EBOP has identified a number of reduction actions that will 
and may be undertaken to reduce nutrient loss and their likely costs (Table 1). For 
2 example, the community wastewater reticulation projects could cost up to $460 
per kg of nitrogen reduction while the storm water upgrade in Rotorua urban areas 
is estimated to cost $348 per kg of nitrogen and $2,098 per kg of phosphorus 
reduced. Other actions however, such as Tikitere geothermal, are able to achieve 
nutrient loss reductions at a much lower cost ($4 per kg). In contrast, it was 
estimated in an earlier version of the draft Lake Rotorua Action Plan (Table 2, 
Draft Lake Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan, Draft 5, February 2007) that nutrient 
reductions through land use and land management change would cost, on average, 
$6 per kg.
1 This figure has been removed from later drafts of this report but it does 
give us a rough estimate of the cost of nutrient reductions achieved through a 
nutrient trading system. Even if this prediction of $6 per kg was incorrect by an 
order of magnitude and should actually be $60 per kg, a nutrient trading system 
would be able to achieve nutrient reductions much more cost effectively than 
some of the options already agreed to by the council. For example, at $60 per kg a 
nutrient trading system would achieve nutrient reductions for less than 20% of the 
cost of achieving the same reductions through the storm water upgrades.
2 If 
stormwater is not included in the nutrient trading system, the Council does not 
have the automatic option of not upgrading the storm water but achieving 
equivalent gains by purchasing allowances from others.  It would have to justify 
its decision on the upgrade in a separate, non-market process which may lead to 
an expensive capital project going ahead irrespective of cheaper alternatives.  
                                                           
1 $6 per kg-N was calculated by Environment Bay of Plenty as a budgeted average for expected 
costs over 10 years. The nutrient reductions from land use/land use management changes are 
expected to continue beyond 10 years, but total costs are assumed to be capped at $10 million. 
2 There may be other reasons for upgrading the storm water system that would lead policy makers 
to decide to undertake this investment. But in this paper we are only considering the investment 
that is undertaken to reduce nutrient loss only.  
3 Table 1 Comparison of nutrient reductions actions for Lake Rotorua 
Cost ($)   Time-
frame 






Per year   Per kg   
Rotorua Wastewater 
Treatment Plant upgrade  
15   0   $1,484,320   $99 (N)   By 
2006  
Community wastewater 
reticulation or OSET 
upgrade for Rotorua  




Storm water upgrades 
within Rotorua urban  





Tikitere geothermal   30   0   $108,200   $4 (N)





[P flocculation in the 
Utuhina Stream]  
[0]
4   [2]   $420,000   $210 (P)   By 
2006  
[P flocculation in two 
other streams]  
[0]   [4]   $840,000   $210 (P)   ~  
Constructed wetlands   N reductions, costs and timeframes will depend on the site and 
proposal. Further evaluation is required  
In-lake/in-stream nutrient 
removal using biomass  
N reductions, costs and timeframes will depend on the site and 




5   25   $25 million 
estimated 
total cost  











6.3   $3,030,000
8   $57 (‘05) 
$33 (‘55) 
$481 (P)  
After 
2011  
  Land use management 
and land use change  
170   6   ~   ~   By 
2017  
Total 228.8  + 
53/92 
Hamurana  
12.75 (inc flocculants) + 
25 (lakebed tmt) + 6.3 
(Hamurana)  
  
Source: Proposed Lakes Rotorua & Rotoiti Action Plan. Environment Bay of Plenty 
Environmental Publication 2007/11. Available from www.envbop.govt.nz  
                                                           
3 This cost per kg-N is lower than other actions because the Tikitere geothermal flow has a high nitrogen 
concentration and low volume, and is close to existing reticulation infrastructure. 
4 [#] means that the action is only temporary until long-term land use change/management actions can take 
effect. 
5 Lakebed sediment treatment will reduce N releases, however these are not calculated towards the N 
reduction target as sediment N releases are excluded (see sections [7] and [9.9] of the draft Action Plan). 
6 The ‘true’ N and P reduction for Lake Rotorua is expected to be lower than this. A Hamurana diversion 
would increase the lake water residence time and decrease oxygenation of bottom waters, thereby increasing 
the influence of other nutrient sources on in lake nutrient concentration. The actual impact of a Hamurana 
diversion on Lake Rotorua’s water quality needs a full assessment. 
7 This load is expected to increase to 92 tonnes-N/year in 50 years time, and 118 tonnes at ‘steady state’ (> 
year 2200). See section 5.5 of the draft Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan for more information. 
8 Presuming mid-range capital cost = $25 million, maintenance costs $30,000 p.a., 50 year lifespan. 
4 1.1.2  Improves the liquidity of the market 
  In an ideal market, participants would be able to buy and sell 
allowances when they wished without affecting the market price (i.e. the market is 
perfectly liquid). In reality, we are unlikely to be able to achieve such an outcome 
but we do need to ensure that there is sufficient liquidity in the market so that it 
functions adequately. 
  Two key things are necessary for the nutrient allowance market to work 
effectively. First, participants need to be able to find willing buyers and sellers 
when they wish to trade. Second, allowances need to have a relatively stable value 
to give allowance holders confidence in their asset. Each of these requirements is 
more likely to be achieved in a more comprehensive system simply because there 
will be more traders and more trades will occur.  
1.1.3  Limits market power 
  Increasing the number of participants and their heterogeneity will 
reduce each participant’s market power. Market power could negatively affect a 
nutrient trading system in three ways. First, it could allow a participant to affect 
the market price (Hahn (1984)). For example, an individual with a large number 
of allowances to sell may be able to push the market price up by holding back 
allowances. Second, if low liquidity leads to dependence on bilateral trade, 
unequal bargaining power may eventuate. Thus the price may reflect the relative 
bargaining power of the parties. For example, if there was a well informed buyer 
in the catchment, they could hold down the price when dealing with less informed 
sellers allowing them to take all of the surplus in the transaction. This could lead 
to equity concerns, but is unlikely to affect the efficiency of the system, unless 
weaker parties choose not to engage in trades. Third, participants may be able to 
exclude others from entering a product market by withholding allowances from 
them (Misiolek and Elder (1989)). This form of market power is unlikely to play a 
role in this catchment. Nearly all of the production from the catchment is sold 
outside the catchment and thus there is limited benefit from excluding an 
additional producer.  
 
5 1.2  Costs of a comprehensive system 
While there are benefits associated with a comprehensive system, there 
are also costs in making the system as comprehensive as possible. These costs can 
be put into three main categories – costs to undertake necessary research, costs to 
individual firms of complying with the system and the administrative costs of 
running the system including verifying data and enforcing the system.
9  
1.2.1  Increases research costs 
  Within a nutrient trading system, the modelled nutrient loss and 
corresponding allowance requirements from each source in the trading system is 
calculated using a model (see Kerr and Rutherford (2008)). This model needs to 
provide a reasonable estimate of nutrient loss for each type of nutrient source 
contained in the system. If the model does not currently provide a reasonable 
estimate of the nutrient loss from a particular land use, either the current model 
will need to be enhanced so that it does or a new model will need to be developed. 
Scientists would need to be funded to complete this work, increasing the research 
costs associated with the system.  
  But by including the additional sources in the nutrient trading system, it 
will also increase the information that we have about their nutrient loss. This 
could be used improve the ability of catchment models to estimate nutrient loss 
from these sources leading to better informed choices of environmental goals.  
1.2.2  Increased participant’s compliance costs 
  Once the nutrient trading system is in place, all nutrient sources will 
need to collect and report sufficient information to calculate their nutrient loss. 
While large nutrient sources may already collect much of the information 
required, smaller sources may not. They may have to collect additional 
information, leading to higher costs to comply with regulation. If these costs are 
going to be very high for some sources, such as small landowners, it may be better 
                                                           
9 The cost to individual sources of undertaking mitigation options are not considered in this paper 
as these cost will need to be borne by sources within the catchment regardless of the nutrient 
control regulation used. The implementation of a nutrient trading system means that the total cost 
of undertaking mitigation options will be less as the system allows the mitigation costs to move to 
the most cost effective periods and places.  
6 to exclude them from the nutrient trading system. Alternatively, these sources 
could be included in a way that has lower compliance costs such as using default 
values for the model.  
1.2.3  Increases administrators’ costs 
  While most people will do their best to comply with a system that they 
see as reasonable, some individuals will want to cheat any system that restricts 
their actions. Thus, in a nutrient trading system, verification and enforcement 
systems need to be in place to decrease this incentive (For more information on 
system compliance for a Lake Rotorua nutrient trading system see Kerr et al 
(2008)). As the system becomes more comprehensive, the cost of verifying data 
and enforcing the system will increase.  
  The verification and enforcement costs associated with each type of 
nutrient source depend on the number of sources involved and the complexity of 
information required to estimate the nutrient loss. Some sources, such as the 
Tikitere diversion, can be included in the system without greatly increasing costs. 
But when a type of source is included that has a large number of individuals with 
a low nutrient loss or requires a significant amount of detailed data to run the 
model, the verification and enforcement costs associated with including them in 
the system may be prohibitive. In this case, more random audits may be needed to 
maintain the same probability that a property is audited.  
For the nutrient trading system to work, a registry of allowance 
holdings needs to be maintained and compliance forms need to processed. As the 
system becomes more comprehensive, the number of participants and 
consequently the number of compliance forms requiring processing will increase. 
This will lead to increased administrative costs of running the system.  
2  Scope of other trading systems 
Since a number of trading systems are already in place, we can look to 
these systems to gain some insight into the preferred scope of the Lake Rotorua 
nutrient trading system. We focus on two New Zealand trading systems – the 
Lake Taupo nutrient trading system and New Zealand Quota Management System 
7 (QMS) for controlling commercial fisheries - and look at the scope of nutrient 
trading systems that have been set up overseas.  
2.1  Lake Taupo Nutrient Trading System 
The Lake Taupo nutrient trading system is being introduced to control 
the amount of nitrogen entering the lake and is still in the early stages of 
implementation.
10 This system includes only pastoral farmers who must hold 
sufficient nutrient allowances to cover their nutrient loss unless their nutrient loss 
is below the permitted activity level. Permitted activity levels are low thresholds 
which ensures that only small properties with low nutrient loss, such as lifestyle 
blocks, do not need to be involved in the system. Non-pastoral farming land uses, 
such as forestry, are not part of the system and do not need to hold nutrient 
allowances. But if they wish to convert to pastoral farming, they must purchase 
nutrient allowances. So properties with a small amount of pastoral farming (e.g. 
lifestyle blocks) and properties involved in non-pastoral land uses are excluded 
from the system. Other nutrient sources, such as wastewater discharges, are 
controlled with separate regulation.  
2.2  Quota Management System 
While the QMS is used for managing commercial fishery harvest, not 
nutrient loss, this system can give us insight into how trading systems work in a 
New Zealand context where some sectors are excluded from the trading system.  
Fisheries regulation in New Zealand focuses on two main goals – fish 
stock sustainability and the utilisation of the fish stocks. Thus the regulations aim 
to maintain fish stock populations without limiting harvest levels more than 
necessary. Other than natural fluctuations, the sustainability of fish stocks is 
affected by three main activities – commercial fishing, recreational fishing and 
customary fishing. It is necessary to control the combined harvest level, the total 
allowable catch (TAC), to achieve the above goal of sustainability.
11 But while the 
                                                           
10 Information on the scope of the Lake Taupo system was provided by Kelly Forster, 
Environment Waikato (pers. comm., 19
th June 2007). For more information on the Lake Taupo 
system see http://www.ew.govt.nz/Policy-and-plans/Protecting-Lake-Taupo/. 
11 The TAC is set by the Minister at a level which will ensure that the fish stock remains at a size 
that is able to sustain the maximum sustainable yield or move the stock towards this size. 
 
8 combined harvest needs to be capped, each of the sectors is managed under 
different regulations.  
Customary fishing is given first priority under fishing regulations to 
satisfy customary fishing rights. As a matter of policy, customary fishing should 
be allocated a share of the TAC by the Minister of Fisheries, which is sufficient to 
fully satisfy customary interests. This share must include sufficient harvest levels 
of fish and seafood for use in events on marae as well as other traditional, non-
commercial uses. The Minister can limit the customary fishing harvest only if he 
believes that the sustainability of the fish stock is threatened.  
While the process for determining the level of customary harvest 
required is clearly defined, there are no strict guidelines that the Minister has to 
follow to split the remaining harvest between recreational and commercial fishers. 
Neither sector has priority in the legislation and the harvest limit for each sector 
must be considered simultaneously. Thus the Minister must use his discretion and 
implicit ranking of the value of each sector. This has lead to contention between 
the two sectors in some fish stocks where both sectors lobby the Minister to 
increase their share of the TAC.
12 In some fisheries, this is not a major concern as 
there is no (or limited) recreational fishing. For example, in the deepwater species 
such as orange roughy, the required investment in fishing boats and equipment 
means that recreational fishermen do not participate in catching this species. In 
contrast, species such as paua and snapper are popular with both recreational and 
commercial fishermen, which can lead to conflict between the two sectors about 
their share of the harvest.  
While the harvest from the customary, recreational and commercial 
fishing sectors should not exceed the TAC, there is limited information on the 
level of both recreational and customary catch levels.
13 There is also uncertainty 
                                                           
 
Guidance is provided to the Minister through the annual Plenary Reports but recommendations 
given in this report do not have to be followed through.  
12 The Ministry is currently investigating policy options which will improve the relationship 
between commercial and recreational fishers including increased involvement of the recreational 
fishing sector more in management decisions and the creation of Fisheries Plans (see Lock and 
Leslie (2007)). 
13 To the authors’ knowledge only two studies (Teirney et al (2007) and Kearney (2002b)) have 
estimated recreational catch in New Zealand in the last 15 years. These studies have large 
9 around the sustainable harvest levels, as was shown in September 2007 when 
substantial adjustments were made to commercial and recreational harvest limits 
in a number of fish stocks (Anderton (2007)). These adjustments included cutting 
the North Island eel commercial catch limit by up to 78%, reducing the hoki 
commercial catch limit by close to 50% in some areas and effectively closing 
fishing for orange roughy in some locations. So while the Minister needs to aim 
for sustainability, there is a large amount of uncertainty in the system. Despite this 
uncertainty and the tension between the sectors, this system has been functioning 
for the last 20 years and is generally considered to be a success story around the 
world. 
The QMS shows that trading systems can be implemented and continue 
to function when some of the sources are excluded from the trading system. This 
suggests that a nutrient trading system for Lake Rotorua could probably function, 
even if some sources are excluded. However, there may be tension between those 
parties that are included in the system and those excluded especially if they are 
not making equal nutrient loss reductions.  
2.3  International nutrient trading markets 
Internationally, nutrient trading systems are increasingly being 
considered as a method to reduce and/or control nutrient loss (The World 
Resources Institute (2007)). The systems implemented vary in a number of ways: 
who is included, what nutrients are controlled, and how nutrient loss is calculated. 
Many of these systems do not include diffuse (non-point source) nutrient loss, 
such as agriculture. Even in the majority of the systems that do include non-point 
sources, the ability of these sources to participate in the system is limited and their 
participation is voluntary. Such systems basically use agriculture as an offset 
mechanism with credits relative to an estimated baseline, to allow for increases in 
nutrient loss from point sources.  
                                                           
differences despite being carried out only a few years apart (Kearney (2002a)). There is also very 
little information on the level of customary harvest in many parts of the country. In the absence of 
this data, the Minister bases the customary allowance on a variable proportion of the recreational 
harvest. But as new customary fishing regulations are applied throughout more of the country, the 
level of information on customary harvest is expected to increase. See Lock and Leslie (2007) for 
more information on estimating recreational and customary catch levels.  
10 Only two systems have regulated non-point sources and allowed them 
to trade. These systems were relatively simple trading systems where the 
participants traded the right to apply manure to the land. While both of the 
systems are now inactive, they were considered to be successful.
14 In one, the 
Upper Maquoketa and South Fork Maquoketa Watersheds Nutrient Trading 
Directory programme, sediment loads were reduced by 25% in the five years that 
the pilot system was operating. These two systems did not allow for trades 
between point sources and non-point sources in the catchment as only non-point 
sources were included.  
To the authors’ knowledge no system currently in place, or previously 
implemented, fully includes point sources and non-point sources and allows 
nutrient allowances to be bought and sold between all parties. This appears to be 
driven by an unwillingness to regulate agriculture.  
3  What do we want to do in the Lake 
Rotorua Catchment? 
Choosing the appropriate scope of a nutrient trading system for the 
Lake Rotorua catchment is not simple. Some sources, such as dairy farmers, 
should clearly be included in the system. Other sources, such as residential 
properties, should clearly be excluded from direct participation. For many sources, 
it is less clear.  
3.1  Sources of nutrients entering Lake Rotorua 
Nutrients enter Lake Rotorua from several types of sources. By 
assessing the nutrient contribution of a particular land use, we can get an idea of 
how important these land uses are to the water quality problem currently and in 
the future. The contribution of nutrients from each of the different land uses has 
been calculated by EBOP (Table 2).  
                                                           
14 The Upper Maquoketa and South Fork Maquoketa Watersheds Nutrient Trading Directory 
programme was introduced as a five-year pilot programme. No permanent scheme has been 
introduced since the pilot finished in December 2005. The Dutch Nutrient Quota System was 
cancelled in 1998 when separate legislation was passed that was considered prior to the 
introduction of this system.  
11 Table 2 Sources of nutrient loss into Lake Rotorua and their nutrient export 
levels.  
Land use   Area (ha)  





total N  
P loss 
coefficient 
(kg/ha/yr)   P load (t/yr) 
% of 
total P  
Native forest and scrub   10,588 4  42.1 5.4  0.12  1.31  3.3 
Exotic forest   9,463  3  28.4  3.6  0.1  0.95  2.4 
Cropping and horticulture   282  60  16.9  2.2  2  0.56  1.4 
Pasture [p]   20,112  See table below   563  71.9  0.84  16.93  42.5 
Lifestyle   556  20  11.1  1.4  0.9  0.5  1.3 
Urban [u]   3,267  See table below   50.1  6.4  1.17  3.82  9.6 
Springs   13  32.7            
Geothermal     42.2  5.4      1.4  3.5 
Waterfowl   1.4  0.2      0.8  2 
Rain 8079  3.659  29.2  3.7  0.16  1.33  3.3 
Total Catchment Inflows   5,234,760   783.1  100  0.76  39.8  100 
 
Breakdown of nutrient loss from pastoral land uses 
Pasture [p] land use 












(t/yr)   % of P 
Beef    1,196 35  41.9  7.4 0.9  1.08  6.4 
Sheep   28  16  0.5  0.1  1  0.03  0.2 
Sheep and beef   10,240  18  184.3  32.7  0.9  9.22  54.4 
Deer   418  15  6.3  1.1  0.9  0.38  2.2 
Deer/sheep/beef    1,294 18  23.3  4.1 0.9  1.16  6.8 
Dairy   5,883  50  294.1  52.2  0.7  4.12  24.3 
Grassland   425  12  5.1 0.9  0.9  0.38  2.2 
Other   628  12  7.5  1.3  0.9  0.57  3.4 
Total   20,112  28  563  100  0.8  16.93  100 
 
Breakdown of nutrient loss from urban land uses 
Urban[u] land use 
includes:  
N (t/yr)   % of u   P (t/yr)   % of u  
Sewage   28.0   55.9   1.00   26.2  
Septic tanks   12.0   23.9   0.53   13.9  
Storm water   10.1   20.2   2.29   59.9  
Total   50.1   100   3.82   100  
Source: Proposed Lakes Rotorua & Rotoiti Action Plan. June 2007. Environment Bay of Plenty 
Environmental Publication 2007/11 
 
 
12 The nutrient sources listed above can be classified into two categories – 
point source and non-point source. This classification can have distinct 
implications for the way nutrient loss is regulated and the transaction costs of 
including particular sources in the system.  
3.1.1 Point  sources 
Some nutrient sources enter Lake Rotorua from a single identifiable 
point, for example urban sewerage and septic tanks. At such sources it relatively 
simple to identify the level of nutrients that are entering the lake. Consequently 
you may wish to have all of these sources within the trading system. However 
there are a large number of small contributors to nutrient loss from sewerage 
treatment plants. To make each of these households responsible for their nutrient 
loss is likely to be inefficient. Instead the Rotorua District Council could be 
responsible for holding sufficient allowances to cover the nutrient loss from the 
sewerage treatment plant on behalf of the residents. Storm water, septic tanks and 
geothermal sources could be treated in the same way. Models to estimate nutrient 
flows from these sources already exist.  The Council could regulate these sources 
in whatever way they choose. 
3.1.2 Non-point  sources 
While it is more difficult to identify the exact level of nutrients lost 
from non-point sources, such as run-off from pastoral farming, this should not be 
a barrier to including non-point sources in the system. Existing models are able to 
model nutrient loss with reasonable accuracy and landowners are not able to 
manipulate the remaining uncertainty to their advantage. It is especially important 
to include non-point sources in the Lake Rotorua catchment as they make up a 
majority of nutrient sources. However we may not want to include all non-point 
sources because modelling nutrient loss for individual land uses is complex, and 
excluding small properties with minimal nutrient loss from the trading system 
would avoid high administrative and compliance costs. But excluding such 
properties would also decrease the efficiency benefits of the trading system. The 
following section empirically explores appropriate thresholds for including 
properties in the Lake Rotorua nutrient trading scheme.  
13 3.2  Thresholds for including different land uses in the 
trading system 
In an ideal world, properties would be included in a nutrient trading 
system if they had sufficiently high nutrient loss and/or low compliance costs. 
Properties that had large nutrient loss would be included in the trading system 
while properties with very little nutrient loss would be excluded or covered by a 
larger body. Properties that have low compliance costs associated with being 
included in the system will be included while those with high compliance costs 
will be excluded. By identifying the nutrient loss of each property, we could 
determine whether they were included in the system or not.  
Such a system is not practical. One of the main costs of being included 
in a nutrient trading system is the cost to the landowner of collecting sufficient 
data to be able to run the model and calculate their nutrient loss. Thus, if every 
source is required to collect sufficient data to assess whether they are included in 
the system, the additional costs of participation in the system are minimal, and 
therefore all sources could be included. But including all sources in the system as 
direct participants is likely to be very inefficient. A number of small sources in the 
catchment have minimal nutrient loss. The additional compliance costs of having 
these properties included is likely to be much higher than the additional benefits 
of including the nutrient loss from these properties.  
Since we cannot use the nutrient loss by property to identify which 
properties are included in the nutrient trading system, a rule, or set of rules, needs 
to be developed to determine which properties are included in the system. These 
rules aim to ensure that properties with a large amount of nutrient loss and/or low 
compliance costs are included in the system while those with low nutrient loss 
and/or high compliance costs are excluded. To achieve this, we need to develop 
proxies that are simple but linked to the nutrient loss from the property.  
Two factors play a large role in determining the nutrient loss off a 
particular property: the property size and the land use. Larger properties are likely 
to have more nutrient loss than smaller properties, however this depends on the 
land use. Horticulture, for example, has more nutrient loss than plantation 
forestry. Therefore a large property covered in plantation forests may have lower 
14 nutrient loss than a much smaller horticulture property. Different land uses also 
face differences in compliance costs. If a land use has a relatively high 
compliance cost, the threshold for inclusion in the system could be set at a higher 
level to account for the increased cost of compliance. Alternatively, for properties 
that are likely to have low nutrient loss, compliance could be made simpler. 
Where possible, it is better not to base thresholds on current land use as this can 
change from year to year and it is complex if parcels enter and exit the system.  
3.3  Analysis of nitrogen distribution from land use 
sources across parcels 
To identify appropriate rules based on land use and property size, we 
first identified the sources of nutrients in the catchment so we could better 
understand the implications of including or excluding different types and sizes of 
parcels. For simplicity, in this analysis we have focused on the non-urban, non-
conservation estate sources of nitrogen loss. Sources of phosphorus may be 
different to sources of nitrogen. To assess this, a similar analysis could easily be 
carried out for phosphorus.  
3.3.1 Dataset  creation 
To undertake this analysis we used a map of 2003 land use in the Lake 
Rotorua catchment provided by EBOP. This map was based on the Land Cover 
Database (LCDB) 2003 satellite imagery and then improved by the land resources 
staff at EBOP. EBOP staff allocated land use areas to the map, defining land uses 
for the pastoral areas and correcting mistakes in the map using their knowledge 




The land use map was combined with the cadastral map to identify the 
areas of each land use located on each parcel in the catchment.
16 By incorporating 
the nutrient loss coefficients from the Action Plan we were able to estimate the 
                                                           
15 The LCDB only provides land cover data such as forest or pasture. It does not distinguish 
between dairy and sheep/beef properties. This information was added in by the EBOP staff.  
16 The cadastral map only gives us parcel boundaries, not the property boundaries. In many cases a 
property consists of multiple parcels and are likely to be managed together. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to identify which parcels are managed together given the data that is available.  
15 total nutrient loss from each parcel as these coefficients provide the nutrient loss 
per hectare by land use.
17 
  The analysis showed a number of discrepancies between the final 
dataset that was developed using the above methodology and the levels of nutrient 
loss given by EBOP (Table 3). This was not unexpected. While the table produced 
the nutrient loss for recent land use, the available map provided land use 
information for 2003. Land use has changed significantly during this time 
(Andrew Wharton, EBOP, pers. comm., 12
th February 2008), which may 
significantly alter the amount of nutrient loss from some parcels and in total. Also 
the two analyses are based on different data. In our analysis, conservation land 
and urban areas are excluded. In the EBOP data only urban areas are excluded.  
Table 3 Comparison of nutrient loss and areas by land use between EBOP 
data and calculated data 
Land use  EBOP Area (ha)  Calculated Area (ha)  EBOP N load (t/yr)  Calculated N load (t/yr)
Native forest and scrub  10,588  7,580
18 42.1  30.5 
Forestry 9,463  8,277  28.4  24.8 
Cropping and horticulture 282  418  16.9  24.9 
Dairying 5,883  6,805
19 294  327.1 
All other pastoral uses  14,229  12,147  268.9  249.6 
Total   41,000
20 35,227  661.4  656.9 
 
These discrepancies do not make the current analysis uninformative. 
Through time the land uses areas will change. Thus the rules developed now need 
                                                           
17 Some land use categories in the land use map did not have nutrient loss coefficients listed for 
them. All of the pastoral land uses, such as horses and alpacas, that did not have a nutrient loss 
coefficient assigned, were assigned a nutrient loss coefficient of 12 kg/ha/yr, which is the ‘other’ 
category in the nutrient loss table. Bare ground was identified in the land use map only. We 
assigned this a nutrient loss coefficient of 3.3 kg/ha/yr, which is the nutrient loss from plantation 
forestry (the lowest emitter) plus ten percent. This assumes that there may be more nutrients lost 
from bare ground than plantation forestry, as no nutrients are taken up by the plants. As bare 
ground only covers 149 ha in the catchment, small inaccuracies in this coefficient are unlikely to 
have a large impact on the analysis.  
Some areas of the catchment were allocated multiple land uses such as ‘deer, beef and 
horses’ or ‘sheep and dairy grazers’. These categories did not match the categories for which we 
had nutrient loss coefficients. We assumed that this land was evenly split between the land uses 
listed when calculating the nutrient loss levels and included ‘dairy grazing’ as ‘dairy’. For 
example, if 100 ha of land was allocated to the category ‘sheep and dairy’, 50 ha was assumed to 
be sheep farming and 50 ha was assumed to be dairy farming. The nutrient loss was then 
calculated accordingly. 
18 This data excludes conservation land.  
19 This data includes dairy grazing land as dairy. 
20 This data includes urban areas. 
16 to be robust to changes in the future. This analysis provides insight into the 
nutrient loss levels from different land uses and different sized parcels at a point 
in time, allowing appropriate thresholds to be identified.  
3.4  Identifying appropriate thresholds 
As outlined earlier, in an ideal world, thresholds would be set to ensure 
that individual sources with high levels of nutrient loss would be included in the 
system. Since in our analysis the nutrient loss by parcel is known, a threshold, in 
terms of nutrient loss, can be identified. Within this catchment, a few privately 
owned parcels contribute a significant proportion of the nutrient loss (Figure 1). 
The top 10, 50 and 100 nitrogen losing parcels contribute 14%, 41% and 57% of 
the total nitrogen loss respectively.  
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Only 239 parcels have nutrient loss above 500 kg/yr and most of the 
remaining properties have much lower losses (Figure 2). The potential gain from 
including parcels with over 500 kg/yr seems likely to justify reasonably careful 
17 monitoring, while for other parcels we may find that the gains from inclusion do 
not justify the transaction costs of participating in the system.  
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This 500 kg/yr threshold provides a first cut for identifying thresholds 
based on parcel area and land use. Using the EBOP nutrient loss per hectare for 
each of the land uses, it is easy to convert this threshold based on nitrogen loss 
into a threshold based on land use and area (Table 4). For example, all parcels that 
had at least 10 ha of dairy land would be included in the system. In contrast, a 
plantation forests might need to be at least 167 ha before it is included in the 
system.  
Different land uses in the catchment have different costs of complying 
with the system. For example, very little data is required to measure nutrient loss 
from plantation forestry. In contrast, the calculation of nutrient loss from livestock 
farming involves the collection of much more data and consequently the costs of 
complying with the system are much higher. 
18  
Table 4 Potential inclusion thresholds based on a 500 kg/yr nitrogen loss 
threshold and the nitrogen loss coefficients 
Land use  Nitrogen loss 
coefficient (kg/ha/yr) 
Land use area threshold 
(ha) 
Horticulture and cropping  60  8.3 
Dairy 50  10 
Non-Dairy Pastoral farming  19
21 26 
Native bush  4  125 
Exotic forestry  3  167 
3.4.1  Horticulture and cropping land 
While horticulture and cropping have the largest nutrient loss 
coefficient, this land use contributes only 2.2% of the nutrient loss in the 
catchment because of the small land area it occupies. Given the small impact on 
nutrient loss that this land use has, it might not be worth including horticulture 
and cropping land in the system if existing models cannot be used to calculate 
their nutrient loss. Given the high per hectare nutrient loss however, it may be 
appropriate to include them even in a very crude way. One option is to require 
landowners to report their total horticulture land area and use existing EBOP 
nutrient loss coefficients to estimate nutrient loss.  
To include horticulture and cropping in the nutrient trading system, an 
appropriate threshold for identifying which parcels are included is required. If the 
500 kg threshold identified above were used, all parcels with at least 8.3 ha of 
horticultural or cropping land would be included. Based on our analysis, only 11 
parcels would meet this criterion and consequently would be included in the 
nutrient trading system (Figure 3). This corresponds to 1.7 tonnes of nitrogen loss 
each year.  
                                                           
21 This coefficient was calculated as the weighted averaged N loss coefficient based on the data 
provided in Table 2. 
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3.4.2  Dairy land  
 545 parcels within the catchment contain dairy and dairy grazing land. 
Given the high nutrient loss from dairy land, it is important to ensure that large 
dairy farms are included in the nutrient trading system. Based on the simple 
thresholds developed above, all parcels with at least 10 ha of dairy land would be 
included in the nutrient trading system. This would lead to an additional 159 
parcels being included in the system (Figure 4) covering over 310 tonnes of 
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To be able to support either horticulture and cropping or dairy farming, 
the land must be highly productive. These are also the two land uses that have the 
highest nutrient losses per hectare and thus it is important that land under these 
land uses are included in the system. Therefore we propose that all parcels with at 
least 10 ha of dairy and/or horticulture and cropping land be included in the 
nutrient trading system.
22 The owners of these parcels will be responsible for 
collecting sufficient information and running the nutrient loss model to calculate 
their nutrient loss and surrendering sufficient allowances to cover their nutrient 
loss. They may also be eligible for any initial free allocation of allowances (For 
more information on the allocation of allowances see Kerr (2008)). This threshold 
also ensures that parcels with a small amount of horticulture, for example, are not 
automatically included in the nutrient trading system and required to collect 
detailed data. 
                                                           
22 This threshold is slightly higher than the threshold discussed above for horticulture and 
cropping. We used 10 ha for simplicity. 
21 3.4.3 Pastoral  land 
1758 parcels have non-dairy pastoral land uses including sheep, beef, 
deer and horses (Figure 5). Based on the 500 kg/yr threshold, all parcels that have 
at least 26 ha of non-dairy pastoral land should be included in the system. To 
capture parcels that have small amount of dairy land and/or horticulture and 
cropping land, we suggest that all parcels that have at least 25 ha of land in 
pastoral farming, horticulture and/or cropping (referred to as ‘pastoral and 
horticulture’ for the remainder of the paper) be included. Therefore parcels with 9 
ha of dairy and 16 ha of sheep/beef farming are included. This adds an additional 
101 parcels and 94.8 tonnes of nutrient loss to the system.  
Figure 5 Total N loss from parcels with pastoral, horticulture and cropping 
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3.4.4  Avoiding undesirable changes in participation over time 
Under these thresholds, parcels with at least 10 ha of combined dairy, 
horticulture and cropping land or at least 25 ha of ‘pastoral and horticulture’ land 
22 are included in the system. We also want to avoid adding parcels to the system 
when their land use changes. Doing so would require annual adjustments to the 
cap and could create perverse incentives across land uses. To avoid this 
complexity, we propose that all parcels 10 ha or larger are included in the system, 
regardless of the land use. This will lead to parcels being included that have 
smaller amounts of pastoral or horticultural land than specified by the above 
thresholds and parcels with plantation forestry and native bush being included in 
the system. It is important that the compliance costs to these parcels are not 
crippling.  
Compliance costs for plantation forestry and native bush areas will be 
low. Landowners will not be responsible for the first 3 kg/ha that is lost from their 
land as they cannot reduce nutrient loss below this level. Therefore, nutrient loss 
from plantation forestry does not need to be covered by allowances each year and 
only 1 kg/ha is required for land that is covered in native bush. Landowners could 
simply report the total area that they have in plantation forestry and native bush to 
allow their nutrient loss to be calculated and thus the default values are not 
needed. 
To minimise compliance costs for parcels with less than 10ha of 
combined dairy, horticulture and cropping and less than 25 ha of pastoral and 
horticultural farming, default values could be used to calculate their nutrient loss 
from pastoral land uses. This would require the landowner to supply information 
on the area in each land use but default values supplied by EBOP could be used to 
calculate the total nutrient loss from pastoral, horticultural and cropping land uses. 
But if the landowner wished to use the actual information from their parcel, they 
could use this instead of the default values.  
  By ensuring that all parcels above 10 ha are included in the system, 
parcels will only stop participating directly in the system when they are 
subdivided to be less than 10 ha. Under the rules outlined above, when parcels 
change land use they will not move into or out of the nutrient trading system, but 
                                                           
23 The two data points with a high total nutrient loss and a small amount of pastoral area are large 
plantation and native bush blocks with only a small amount of pastoral land.  
23 the level of information that they are required to collect may change. For example, 
if the total pastoral area falls below 25 ha, the landowner will now have the option 
to use default values.  
3.4.5  What about other parcels? 
The above rules include 88.5% of nitrogen loss from the catchment. 
The excluded parcels are either urban parcels, smaller than 10ha or owned by the 
Department of Conservation.  
To achieve the most flexibility in the system, all sources of nutrient loss 
should be included. The land owned by the Department of Conservation (DoC) 
should be included in the system with DoC responsible for reporting and holding 
sufficient allowances to cover nutrient loss from all of their land. As this land is 
managed as an estate, DoC could complete a single report of the nutrient loss from 
all of the conservation land in the catchment. The Rotorua District Council (RDC) 
and EBOP should be made responsible for surrendering sufficient allowances to 
cover the nutrient loss from parcels smaller than 10 ha. The parcels that each 
council is responsible for should follow their jurisdiction. RDC should hold 
allowances on behalf of urban parcels while EBOP should be responsible for the 
small non-urban parcels such as lifestyle blocks.
24 The councils will be required to 
report and estimate the total nutrient loss off the parcels they are responsible for 
and surrender sufficient allowances. To control nutrient loss they can undertake 
mitigation options or use regulations to limit nutrient loss.  
3.4.6  Why use parcels? 
We propose that land use areas in parcels rather than properties should 
be used to determine whether land is included in the nutrient trading system 
because parcel size are relatively unchanging through time. Farmers often manage 
their parcels simultaneously. This means a landowner can jointly report on all of 
their parcels at once, including opting to have parcels smaller than 10ha in the 
system. Once a parcel enters the nutrient trading system it can only leave the 
                                                           
24 Urban land is defined in EBOP’s Regional Water and Land Plan as “an area which contains an 
aggregation of more than 50 lots or sites of an average size of no more than 1000m
2”. The same 
definition should be used here.  
24 system if the parcel is sold, providing the new owner the option of including or 
excluding the parcel in the nutrient trading system. This stops parcels entering and 
leaving the system annually but avoids locking in small parcels. 
4 Summary 
Based on an analysis of the distribution of nutrient loss from parcels in 
the Lake Rotorua catchment, a set of rules have been developed to identify which 
parcels are included in the nutrient trading system (Figure 6). The thresholds 
developed in this analysis are only indicative of the values that should be used.  
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